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The Use of Mediation to Settle
Prisoner Grievances in Federal Court
Michelle Burns
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2011, the United States had a total of 1,598,780 prisoners under the
jurisdiction of state or federal correctional facilities.1 California alone had
149,569 prisoners under the jurisdiction of its thirty-three federal and state
prisons.2 Nineteen of these prisons in California are located in the Eastern
District of California of the Ninth Circuit.3 While these numbers alone are
overwhelming, these statistics are not just numbers; they are actual people
who are sentenced to confinement and subject to the conditions of
overcrowded prisons.4 The Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision in Brown v. Plata
forced California to reduce its prison population and highlighted the tension
between the constitutional rights of prisoners within the prison system and
conditions of confinement in California prisons.5 The relationship between
the prisoners and the prisons within which they are confined directly relates
to the constitutional violations alleged by prisoners in grievances against
those institutions. The litigation claims that prisoners file under 18 U.S.C. §
1983 in federal courts claim a violation of constitutional rights that accounts
for a large portion of the caseload in the Eastern District of California in the
Ninth Circuit.6
This article will explore how different courts have used alternative
dispute resolution methods, specifically mediation and mediation-like
1. E. Ann Carson & William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2011, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
(Dec. 17, 2012), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4559.
2. Id.; see also Eastern District of California Swamped by Prisoner Lawsuits, THE THIRD
BRANCH
NEWS
(July
2010),
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/TheThirdBranch/10-0701/Eastern_District_of_California_Swamped_by_Prisoner_Lawsuits.aspx
3. Id.
4. See Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Tell California to Cut Prisoner Population, N.Y. TIMES,
May
23,
2011
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/us/24scotus.html?_r=0&ref=prisonsandprisoners&
pagewanted=print.
5. See generally Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
6. THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS, supra note 2.
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programs, to settle prisoner litigation claims that have overwhelmed the
caseloads of federal district courts over the past few decades.7 In the Ninth
Circuit, generally, and the Eastern District of California, specifically, the
number of pro se prisoner complaints filed per year has increased the burden
of an already budget-tight judicial system.8 Limitations in the amount of
available judgeships and the location of California prisons have created a
problem unique to the Eastern District of California. While other federal
districts have developed programs to accommodate heavy caseloads through
ADR programs, the Eastern District is now creating and implementing a
variety of programs to deal with the influx.
Section II (a) of this article will review the statutes under which
prisoners may file Section 1983 claims in the Federal District Courts.
Section II (b) will address the overburdened Eastern District of California’s
struggles to handle the large amounts of prisoner grievance cases that fall
under its jurisdiction. Section III of this article will highlight the programs
now in place in the Eastern District of California as well as the District of
Nevada and the District of Idaho as a point of comparison. Section IV of
this article will explore the implications of these programs with the
traditional mediation model and some of the difficulties in implementing
these programs. Finally, Section V will conclude that ADR programs in
prisoner litigation cases can work to alleviate caseloads and also have the
potential to address the civil rights of prisoners and remedy the troublesome
nature of prisons.
II. SECTION 1983 CLAIMS AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT
A. Background on Prisoner Grievances
Prisoners of the federal prison system file grievances under 42 U.S.C. §
1983,9 which creates a private cause of action for the deprivation of
constitutional rights.10 Section 1983 provides a mechanism for all private
actors to bring actions alleging a violation of their constitutional rights.11
The text of the section reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
10. See Henry F. Fradella, In Search of Meritorious Claims: A Study of the Processing of
Prisoner Civil Rights Cases in a Federal District Court, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 23, 25 (1999).
11. Id. at 25.
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citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
depravation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
12
proceeding for redress . . . .

While the statute does not specifically extend this mechanism to
prisoners, prisoners do retain many constitutional rights after their
confinement.13 Furthermore, case law has provided that a prisoner’s right to
access the courts extends to civil rights claims.14 Therefore, prisoners may
use this section to “challenge the conditions of their confinement.”15 For
prisoners, the ability to file complaints alleging violations of their
constitutional rights may be increasingly important as the nature of their
confinement limits their ability to take action against violations of their
constitutional rights.16 Prisoners usually file grievances for violations of
their constitutional rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.17 First Amendment claims include violations of the exercise
of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of association, access to libraries,
and access to non-legal mail.18 Eighth Amendment violations include
excessive force, failure to protect, medical treatment, conditions of
confinement, retaliation, and general allegations of cruel and unusual
punishment.19 Lastly, Fourteenth Amendment claims involve violations of
due process and retaliation claims.20
Due in large part to the perception that many claims filed by prisoners
under section 1983 are frivolous and place a burden on district courts,

12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
13. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
14. JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS, 167-68 (Elisabeth Roszmann
Ebben & Michael C. Braswell eds., 9th ed. 2010).
15. Fradella, supra note 10, at 25.
16. See PALMER, supra note 14, at 169.
17. Fradella, supra note 10, at 33.
18. Id. at 33. Freedom of religion claims often arise when an item or act that the prisoner
claims is included in his practice of religion is on a restricted list inside the prison.
19. Id. Claims of retaliation usually include a prisoner claiming that the correctional officers
or prison officials acted out against the prisoner because the prisoner filed a grievance in the prison.
Section 1983 Prisoner Litigation Fundamentals Seminar UC DAVIS SCHOOL OF LAW (Dec. 2, 2011),
http://mediasite.ucdavis.edu/Mediasite/
SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid=b5e1be3dc4f844dd94ca4a51d781bc0c1d (on file with author)
20. Early Inmate Mediation Program, U.S. DIST. COURT OF NEV., 18 (2010), available at
http://www.nvd.uscourts.gov/Files/DC_Report2010.pdf; Fradella, supra note 10, at 33.
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Congress passed the Prison Litigation Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) in 1996.21 The
purpose in passing this legislation was to discourage prisoners from filing
frivolous claims and thereby flooding the federal courts with prisoner
grievances.22 It was “estimated that more than seventy percent of prisoner
filings under section 1983 were frivolous.”23
PLRA included the following provisions in order to limit the number of
prisoner grievance filings:24 (1) the prisoner is required to pay at least a
partial amount of the filing fee, and if the prisoner cannot afford it, the
prison will deduct the money from the prison account regularly;25 (2) if a
claimant has had three previous complaints dismissed for being frivolous,
malicious, or failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the
prisoner will not be allowed to file another complaint;26 (3) no monetary
damages may be awarded unless there was physical harm;27 (4) the federal
district courts must screen the complaints to assure that they are not
frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or seek damages from a defendant with immunity;28 (5) the court has the
21. See PALMER, supra note 14, at 413; see also Derek Borchardt, The Iron Curtain Redrawn
Between Prisoners and the Constitution, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 469, 470-71 (2012).
22. See PALMER, supra note 14, at 415. Furthermore, PLRA reduced judges’ ability to order
certain types of remedies, such as making broad policy changes or orders for release. Christopher E.
Smith & Christopher E. Nelson, Perceptions of the Consequences of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act: A Comparison of State Attorneys General and Federal District Judges, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 295,
295 (2002). Incidentally PLRA, while an attempt to lessen caseloads, may have created a more
time-consuming process for handling prisoner litigation in the federal courts. Id.
23. See PALMER, supra note 14, at 413. Those same estimates indicate that in the Ninth
Circuit, ninety-nine percent of prisoner civil rights filings were frivolous. Id.
24. See id., supra note 14, at 416–17, for a summary on the provisions of PLRA.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (2012). In instances where the prisoner is allowed to proceed in
forma pauperis, the court may still require the prisoner to pay a partial filing fee. PALMER, supra
note 14, at 418. This may be done over time by withdrawals from the prisoner’s account until the
amount is paid in full. Id. at 419. In addition, the prisoner must still pay the filing fee if the
complaint is dismissed. Id.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012). This provision is meant not only to stop the flow of frivolous
lawsuits into the federal courts, but also to act as a deterrent for prisoners to file a multitude of
claims without real merit. PALMER, supra note 14, at 419. Individually, a prisoner is required to
determine which claims are worth pursuing so as not to lose the opportunity to file another
complaint. However, the statute does state that in the event that the prisoner is in “imminent danger
of serious physical injury,” they should be allowed to file despite the “three strikes” rule. Id.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2012). The statute reads, “No Federal civil action may be brought
by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury
suffered while in custody, without a prior showing of physical injury.” Id. This provision places a
limit on the relief the court may grant to the prisoners, making it less likely for prisoners to receive
monetary rewards for these claims.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(b) (2012). The court is required to
screen all complaints and may dismiss any complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, even in cases where the prisoner is not filing in forma pauperis. PALMER, supra
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power to revoke “goodtime” credits from a prisoner if the court finds the
prisoner is filing to harass prison staff;29 (6) limits are placed on available
attorneys fees;30 and (7) prisoners are required to exhaust all administrative
remedies available at the institutions before filing in federal court.31
However, the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement at the
institutions is not regulated.32 Prisons create and administer these grievance
procedures and compliance is not necessary to get into court. While this is a
possible way to solve conflicts before courts become involved, the lack of
regulation may just be serving to make the process more difficult for
prisoners to get violations against their civil rights at the hands of those
violating their rights.33
PLRA’s exhaustion and screening requirements have not necessarily
eased the burden of prisoner grievance complaints on the courts. As the
majority of litigants are pro se, the screening requirement takes both time
and man power in the courts to review complaints for cognizable claims.
B. Caseloads in Ninth Circuit
The District Courts of the Ninth Circuit are currently overburdened with
case filings for limited judgeships. This has created a significant problem in
districts that have a large number of prisoner grievances filed under section

note 14, at 419. The standard of review for screening these complaints is abuse of discretion, giving
wide latitude to the district courts to determine where a prisoner has stated a cognizable claim. Id.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1932 (2012). In the event that the court determines that a prisoner’s complaint
or series of complaints are being filed for the purpose of harassment of a prison official, the court
may revoke any “good behavior” credits. PALMER, supra note 14, at 419. These credits sometimes
provide prisoners with certain privileges and possibly an earlier release. Id. The court may take this
action on its own upon a finding of harassment. Id.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2012). While the attorneys’ fees provision does not relate to the
purpose of this article specifically, the general idea that there are limits on what will be awarded to
attorneys may serve to temper prisoner litigation filings.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012). The statute reads, “No action shall be brought with respect
to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title or under any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted.” Id. The exhaustion of administrative remedies as a prerequisite to filing in
federal court serves varying purposes. Not only is it an attempt to ensure that claims that reach the
court system have some merit, it also gives institutions the opportunity to solve or correct problems
before they are taken to court.
32. Borchardt, supra note 21, at 490.
33. See id. at 490.
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1983.34 In particular, the Eastern District of California has the largest
caseload of the United States Federal Courts.35 Prisoner litigation makes up
about fifty-four percent of the civil caseload in the Eastern District.36 The
geographic location that the Eastern District of California encompasses
covers around seventy percent of the prisons in California.37 This number
reflects “roughly 100,000 prisoners” filing their grievances in the Eastern
District.38 In contrast, upon average, prisoner litigation usually takes up
about ten percent of a district’s caseload.39
This heavy caseload mixed with shortages in judgeships have increased
the workload of the current judges in the Eastern District.40 Visiting judges
from other districts and the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit
volunteered to help with prisoner civil right mediation programs in order to
deal with the flood of prisoner litigation in the district.41 Districts in the
Ninth Circuit adopted ADR programs in prisoner litigation cases in order to
reach a settlement before trial.42 These programs include the use of thirdparty neutral mediators, federal district court judges, and, more commonly,
federal court magistrate judges.43 Generally, magistrate judges can be
assigned many of these types of cases in order to alleviate some of the strain
on the district court judges.44 These settlements take place at varying times

34. THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS, supra note 2.
35. Eastern District Uses Innovative Practices But Still Needs More Judges, U.S. DIST.
COURT, E. DIST. OF CAL., http://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caednew/index.cfm/news-updates/easterndistrict-of-california-needs-new-judgeships-to-stem-docket-overload2/.
36. THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS, supra note 2.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. “Prisoner lawsuits last year [2009] gave the district the highest weighted civil caseload
per judgeship in the nation.” Id. The district still ranks at the top of the nation for total filings in a
year and pending cases. Id.
40. See United States District Court-Caseloads and Statistics, California Eastern, U. S.
COURTS
FOR
THE
NINTH
CIRCUIT
(Nov.
4,
2012,
7:46
PM),
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/statistics/ca_eastern.pdf. In 2011, the Eastern District had a total of
6,734 filings and civil filings were distributed at 933 per judgeship. Id. Overall, judges had 1,319
cases pending per judgeship. Id. Note that these numbers contain all civil filings and are not limited
to prisoner litigation cases, but such filings are included in the numbers for civil filings.
41. THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS, supra note 2.
42. Id. An overview of some of the implemented programs will be discussed in detail below.
As an initial measure to alleviate some of the stress of the caseload, judges from around the circuit
volunteered to mediate prisoner civil right cases. Id.
43. Eastern District Uses Innovative Practices But Still Needs More Judges, supra note 35.
44. THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS, supra note 2. Despite the success of the efforts of the district
thus far in settling prisoner litigation, new filings continue to outpace case terminations. Eastern
District Uses Innovative Practices But Still Needs More Judges, supra note 35.
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in the litigation process, depending on the program the courts adopt.45 The
nature of these complaints generally lends itself well to the mediation
process, considering the on-going relationship between the parties and the
court’s interest in judicial economy. Additionally, the use of mediation to
settle these complaints may also serve as a conduit for prisoner rehabilitation
and social justice.
III. PRISONER ADR PROGRAMS IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,
THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA, AND THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
Courts have adopted various programs throughout the Ninth Circuit to
handle the high level of prisoner civil rights litigation.46 The Eastern District
of California’s program will be the main focus of this article.47 As points for
contrast in the shape prisoner ADR programs may take, the District of
Nevada’s and the District of Idaho’s programs will also be addressed.48
A. Nevada49
The program in the District of Nevada uses a two-track system, which
includes a mediation track and a litigation track.50 This program uses both
an early mediation model as well as a post-summary judgment settlement
conference model similar to that used in the Eastern District of California.51
Early mediation initially diverts all prisoner grievances to the mediation
45. THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS, supra note 2.
46. Interview with Denise M. Asper, Prison Litigation Project Director, Judicial Council of the
Ninth Circuit Office of the Circuit Executive, in L.A., Cal. (Nov. 29, 2012).
47. See Denise M. Asper, Mediating Behind Bars: ADR Options in Prisoner Civil Rights
Cases,
PACE
LAW
LIBRARY,
http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/committees/adr/publications/ADR_Options_in_Prisoner_Cases2.pdf
(last visited November 4, 2012); Early Inmate Mediation Program, supra note 20; John F. Murtha &
Brett Bitzer, A New Pro Bono Opportunity With The District Court of Nevada: Mediation of
Prisoners’ § 1983 Civil Rights Actions, NEV. LAW., July 2008, at 26.
48. It should be noted that the program explored in the Eastern District is younger than the
programs established in both the District of Nevada and the District of Idaho. The circumstances
surrounding the number of prisoner civil litigation cases filed in the Eastern District of California
has influenced the method of implementation of the ADR in this district. Furthermore, the programs
in the District of Nevada and the District of Idaho are meant only to illustrate the different types of
ADR methods that may be utilized to handle prisoner civil litigation claims.
49. See generally Murtha & Bitzer, supra note 47.
50. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46.
51. Id.
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track.52 Private attorneys work as mediators and must be trained in
mediation.53 Prisoners are not usually represented in these mediations.54
The early mediation model uses the private attorneys acting as mediators
while the post summary judgment settlement conference model uses
magistrate judges.55 The early mediation model requires backing and
support from the Department of Corrections in order to get the parties to
settle without the claims having survived summary judgment.56
B. Idaho
The District of Idaho uses ADR in prisoner litigation cases at three
possible points in litigation—pre-answer mediation, mediation at the close
of discovery, and judicially supervised settlement conferences prior to trial.57
The judicially supervised settlement conference addresses cases at the point
in litigation when the claim has survived summary judgment.58 The program
uses both magistrate judges and private mediators in its settlement.59 The
magistrate judges have been trained in ADR and may use mediation
techniques in the settlement conferences.60
In screening the cases for mediation or settlement, the district looks at
the type of claim.61 The program looks for trends in the claims from
prisoners so that some claims can be grouped together by type or even by
institution in order to address any institution wide claims.62 Once these are
identified, the cases are consolidated and appointed attorneys from the pro
bono program in the district.63 These appointments are limited-scope
appointments in which one attorney is appointed for the entire group,
mimicking a class action civil procedure structure.64 The appointment
removes the mediator or magistrate judge from being in the position of

52. Murtha & Bitzer, supra note 47, at 28.
53. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Asper, supra note 47.
58. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46.
59. Id. When a magistrate judge is acting as a facilitator for agreement, the program is called
a “judicially supervised settlement conference.” Id. In the alternative, when a private mediator is
acting in the program, the process is termed “mediation.” Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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having to give legal advice to the prisoner as they are often uninformed
about the law and the types of remedies that are allowed and feasible.65
This type of screening has had some success in creating institution wide
remedies.66 By addressing a certain issue that many prisoners had, the court
was able to clear the docket of a large number of groups rather than
individually going to trial and possibly requiring the defendants to pay
monetary damages to each individual prisoner.67 However, in these types of
consolidated cases, it is essential for all the stakeholders, including the
prisoners, the Attorney General, and the prison to “buy in.”,68 Additionally,
the smaller size of the district allows for this type of large scale screening
process.
C. Eastern District of California
The large geographical region that the Eastern District of California
encompasses includes a large number of prisons.69 Cases are assigned to
different district court judges, who often assign them to magistrate judges.70
Both district judges and magistrate judges have staff attorneys in their
chambers who have subject matter expertise in the area of prisoner
litigation.71 Complaints are screened under the requirements provided in
PLRA.72 Once the court finds that a prisoner has stated a claim upon which
relief may be granted, the complaints are screened for mediation on an
individual basis.73 Staff attorneys look for complications in the case or lack
of a need for large policy changes as a remedy.74 This program does not use
the consolidation approach in screening complaints but looks for individual
claims to settle.75 Through this process, the cases are screened on an

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS, supra note 2.
70. Telephone Interview with Sujean Park, ADR and Pro Bono Program Director, U.S.
District Court – Eastern District of California (Dec. 10, 2012).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. Telephone Interview with Honorable Craig Kellison, Federal Magistrate Judge, U.S.
District Court – Eastern District of California (Dec. 13, 2012).
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individual basis as to whether or not the case would be a good candidate for
mediation.76 Sometimes the court will send an order setting the case to
mediation and requiring the State (the Attorney General, representing the
particular prison or institution and parties named thereunder) to explain why
the case should not go to mediation or to a settlement conference.77
In the Eastern District of California, settlement conferences or
mediations usually occur after dispositive motions, meaning the case must
survive summary judgment before it goes to mediation.78 Waiting until after
the claim has survived summary judgment creates a greater incentive for the
State to want to settle.79
In the Eastern District of California, magistrate judges perform
settlement conferences either inside the prisons, by video, or by court-call
depending on what is feasible.80 The ADR program in place in the Eastern
District works closely with the pro bono panel of the district in order to get
some appointments of counsel for the prisoners, but usually prisoners are not
represented in mediations or settlement conferences.81
The ADR program in the Eastern District also utilizes McGeorge Law
School at the University of the Pacific and its Prisoner Civil Rights
Mediation Clinic.82 The clinic works with Magistrate Judge Craig Kellison
as co-mediators in the settlement of prisoner civil rights litigation.83 The
students interview the prisoner before the mediation is set to take place.84
Students provide prisoners with information about the mediation or
settlement conference process and allow the prisoner an opportunity to tell
his or her story.85 Students then provide Judge Kellison with a confidential
memo with information about the prisoner in order to facilitate the process
76. Id. In my conversation with Judge Kellison, he asserted that, in his experience, the State
hardly ever settles before it survives summary judgment. Telephone Interview with Honorable Craig
Kellison, supra note 75. This is presumably because the state does not really deem the suit a risk or
a threat before this point.
77. Id.; Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46.
78. Telephone Interview with Sujean Park, supra note 70.
79. Telephone Interview with Honorable Craig Kellison, supra note 75.
80. THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS, supra note 2.
81. Telephone Interview with Sujean Park, supra note 70. In a similar format to that of the
District of Idaho, magistrate judges perform settlement conferences rather than mediations. This
distinction is important as it may suggest differences in the way a case is settled.
82. Id. When working with the students in the clinic, the process is called a “co-mediation”
rather than a supervised settlement conference. Id.
83. Here, certain aspects of mediation, which are lost in settlement conferences by magistrate
judges, are restored by the involvement of the students. This program tends to look more like a
mediation than the settlement conferences involving only a magistrate judge do.
84. Telephone Interview with Honorable Craig Kellison, supra note 75.
85. Id.
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of settlement.86 After speaking with the students, the prisoners are more
informed about the process of the settlement conference or mediation.87
This way the judge does not have to explain to the prisoner certain aspects of
the settlement agreement, like confidentiality, which can take some time.
This system also works to better facilitate settlement.88 Judge Kellison
explained that although he does not alter his methods in gaining settlement
when he is practicing with the students or without, he has found that overall
the process has run more smoothly when the students interview the prisoners
before the settlement conference.89
In the Eastern District of California in 2012, magistrate judges held
thirty-four settlement conferences in prisoner civil rights cases and settled
twenty-one of those cases.90 In 2012, no volunteer attorney mediators were
used to settle cases.91 The McGeorge Clinic, along with Judge Kellison,
settled nine of seventeen settlement conferences.92 In 2008, thirty cases
went to settlement and fifty percent were settled; in 2009, forty-nine cases
went to settlement and forty-five percent were settled; in 2010, seventy-one
cases went to settlement and thirty-seven percent were settled; in 2011,
forty-two cases went to settlement and thirty-one percent were settled; and in
2012, fifty-eight cases went to settlement and forty-five percent were
settled.93
The use of ADR programs to settle prisoner civil rights cases has not yet
been studied with an emphasis on providing data that would indicate the
actual rates of success of these programs in providing a solution to the
overwhelming caseloads, including prisoner civil rights claims. Despite the
lack of empirical data to support a movement toward ADR as a solution to
prisoner civil rights claims, an exploration of settlement of these claims
through mediation or mediation techniques in settlement conferences will
illuminate the numerous positive effects these programs can have in this
context. The nature of these settlements has the ability to provide benefits
for the prisons, the prisoners, and the courts. The regular use of mediations

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CAED Settlement Statistics, Prisoner Civil Rights Cases – provided by S. Park.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to settle prisoner grievance claims may also influence the in-house grievance
procedures such that the institutions adopt more effective tools that limit the
number of cases that come to court.94
IV. THE MEDIATION PROCESS IN THE PRISONER GRIEVANCE CONTEXT
A. Mediation Process Considerations
The use of mediation or settlement conferences to settle prisoner
grievance claims as applied in the various ADR programs established in the
Ninth Circuit brings forth some important implications in comparison to the
traditional mediation model. The nature of the types of claims to be settled
between the parties as well as the different types of mediation-like methods
the courts have applied in their ADR programs both contribute to the unique
nuances in the mediation process.95 These differences have possible
negative and positive effects as to whether mediation is the appropriate
method for settlement of prisoner grievances and its overall success.
Overall, however, mediation or mediation-like settlement conferences can
accommodate certain aspects of prisoner litigation that the courts cannot.
This is in addition to the potential for judicial economy through these ADR
programs.96
First, there are multiple levels of power issues at work in some of these
types of mediations or settlement conferences.97 There is a distinct power
imbalance between the parties in prisoner grievance litigation. A party, the
prisoner, is usually at a substantially disadvantaged bargaining position
compared to the other party, the State,98 which can cause a serious issue in
the mediation process.99 Power imbalances in mediations can undermine the
process of mediation as a forum in which both parties come to a mutually
94. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46.
95. See Louise Otis & Eric H. Reiter, Mediation By Judges: A New Phenomenon in the
Transformation of Justice, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 374 (2006). “The nature of the conflict,
coupled with the ways in which the participants understand and characterize that conflict, largely
determines the intensity of the conflict, the scope of its issues, and ultimately the options for its
resolution.” Id.
96. See Jordi Agustí-Panareda, Power Imbalances in Mediation: Questioning Some Common
Assumptions, 59 DISP. RESOL. J. 24, 29 (2004).
97. See Benjamin F. Overton, From the Chair: Training is Essential for Judges as Mediators!,
7 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 2 (2001).
98. The “State” includes the prisons or institution and their employees, who are the usual
named defendants in prisoner grievances, as well as the Attorney General who represents them.
99. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46. This is of particular concern when the
party with the disadvantaged bargaining position is not represented by counsel or there is a limited
purpose appointment. Id.
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agreeable solution to their conflict.100 Whether the program established by
the district court includes a third-party neutral mediator or a magistrate judge
to facilitate the settlement process, the way this power imbalance is handled
directly influences the relative success of getting to an agreement or the type
of agreement reached.101 What the individual mediator does to account for a
power imbalance is not within the scope of this discussion. Nonetheless, the
presence of a third party, whether a mediator or a magistrate judge,
influences the power dynamic between the parties.102 Third-party neutrals
and magistrate judges alike may have influence over the parties as a result of
legal expertise or experience in this area, which can aid in coming to a
successful agreement despite the parties’ unequal bargaining positions.103
The use of magistrate judges to perform settlement conferences in
prisoner grievance cases brings forward another dynamic of power into the
settlement conference.104 The way the magistrate judge performs the
settlement conference and the techniques he utilizes influences the power
balance of the mediation—but so does the perception of the judge by the
parties.105 Judges are a part of the court system so the prisoners may
perceive the judge as impartial, independent of the influence of the prison
and a legitimate source of power within the negotiation of a settlement.106
On the other hand, there is a possibility that judges are more likely to control

100. Power imbalance issues in mediation stem from the assumption that the party in the
stronger position will bully the weaker party into settlements. However, there are arguments that
weaker parties are protected against this threat in the mediation setting because they may simply
refuse to settle if they feel forced into an agreement. See Agustí-Panareda, supra note 96, at 28-29.
101. Id. at 29.
102. Id. at 30.
103. See George F. Cole & Jonathan E. Silbert, Alternative Dispute-Resolution Mechanisms for
Prisoner Grievances, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 306, 318 (1984).
104. The term settlement conference is used to identify when a magistrate judge is acting as the
facilitator of conversation between the parties. Telephone Interview with Sujean Park, supra note
70. To a large extent, the magistrate judges use mediation techniques to help facilitate settlement
between the parties. Telephone Interview with Honorable Craig Kellison, supra note 75. In
settlement conferences, both parties are free to not settle and proceed onto litigation. However,
when a magistrate judge is holding the settlement conference, he may be more likely to inform the
parties of the negative consequences of not settling a particular case.
105. See Otis & Reiter, supra note 95, at 362; Omer Shapira, Exploring the Concept of Power
in Mediation: Mediators’ Sources of Power and Influence Tactics, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
535, 549-50 (2009).
106. See Otis & Reiter, supra note 95, at 365.
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the process and the solution more so than other civil mediations.107 As a part
of the court system, the magistrate judge may influence the parties to come
to settlement; this is particularly true of the prisoner.108 In the context of
prisoner litigation, this may aid in a successful mediation or settlement
process. The inherent tension between the parties could inhibit their ability
to communicate well enough to come to some sort of an agreement––with a
magistrate judge working as a facilitator for agreement, both parties are
forced to communicate with the other and are pushed toward reaching a
settlement rather than continuing into litigation, if possible.109 The extent to
which this is done may help or hinder the settlement depending on the
particular relationship between the prison and the prisoner.110 However, the
nature of the relationship between the parties and the law in prisoner
grievance settlements can benefit from mediation in the shadow of the
law.111
Other factors also may contribute to a power imbalance, especially if the
prisoner is not aware of the legal issues and does not have representation.
When the parties are not aware of their legal rights or the process in general,
the magistrate judge or the mediator may be in a position where they have to
decide between informing the prisoners of their legal rights and allowing the
defendants to take advantage of the prisoners’ unawareness of these rights.112
This puts the mediator in a difficult position, especially when the prisoner
begins to ask for legal advice, because the mediator needs to be neutral.113
In the alternative, if prisoners are not represented, they may enter the
mediation or settlement conference with unrealistic expectations about the

107. Cf. id., at 367 (explaining that the use of judicial mediation intensifies the mediator’s
difficulty in allowing the parties to control the process).
108. Shapira, supra note 105, at 549-50.
109. See KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 342 (3d ed. 2004)
(explaining that mediations and settlements in the court context push parties to settle).
110. Additionally, this power imbalance is not necessarily something that can be remedied in
prisoner grievance litigation in either mediation or in the court system. See Agustí-Panareda, supra
note 96, at 29.
111. See Otis & Reiter, supra note 95, at 378.
112. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46. The use of magistrate judges instead of
mediators moves the process away from what is usually called mediation. However, in some cases,
the use of a judge in ADR to settle prisoner civil rights complaints may be more useful as the
prisoner may view and respect the authority of a judge more so than they would a private mediator.
Honorable Candy Wagahoff Dale, Judicially Supervised Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Perspectives From A Magistrate Judge, 56 FED. LAW. 47, 58 (2009).
113. Webcasts, UC Davis School of Law, Section 1983 Prisoner Litigation Fundamentals
Seminar (Dec. 2, 2011), http://mediasite.ucdavis.edu/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid=
b5e1be3dc4f844dd94ca4a51d781bc0c1d.
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type or amount of remedies they should receive.114 For example, if a
prisoner requests to be released as the remedy for a claim with respect to
prisoner conditions, they must be aware that this type of remedy is only
available in very limited circumstances and not available in settlements.115
As a result, the prison may feel like it would be a waste of time to continue
the settlement. This also happens in contexts where the prisoners request
large monetary sums.116 This slows down the settlement process and could
cause the prison to be less willing to settle or communicate with the
prisoner. However, mediators may be able to “talk the prisoner down” from
the first high offers in settlements, maybe even more so than in other nonprisoner litigation cases.117 If the mediator or judge is viewed by the
prisoner as trustworthy and having expertise in the area of the conflict, the
prisoner is likely to allow the facilitator to guide the negotiation offers to a
more realistic level.
Similarly, if the prison is unwilling to offer any sort of acceptable relief
for the prisoner, this might shut down communication efforts in the
settlement conferences. There is often a problem with sufficient “buy-in”
from the defendants—in most cases the prison or the State as represented by
the Attorney General.118 To be successful, “[m]ediation requires agreement
by all parties that the issues are open for discussion and possible
resolution.”119 If the prisons and their representatives are not open to
negotiating a settlement with prisoners, the entire process is useless.120
Some possible reasons for the prisons to avoid settling with prisoners may
include the public’s negative perception of such settlements and the need of
the prison and correctional officers to “save face” in front of prisoners.
There is little incentive for the State to agree to mediation or settlement over
114. Telephone Interview with Honorable Jennifer L. Thurston, U.S. Magistrate Judge, U.S.
District Court – Eastern District of California (Dec.10, 2012).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3) (2012).
116. Webcasts, UC Davis School of Law, Section 1983 Prisoner Litigation Fundamentals
Seminar (Dec. 2, 2011), http://mediasite.ucdavis.edu/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid=
b5e1be3dc4f844dd94ca4a51d781bc0c1d.
117. Id.
118. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46.
119. George F. Cole, et. al, Mediation: is it an effective alternative to adjudication in resolving
prisoner complaints?, 65 JUDICATURE 481, 486 (May 1982).
120. Webcasts, UC Davis School of Law, Section 1983 Prisoner Litigation Fundamentals
Seminar (Dec. 2, 2011), http://mediasite.ucdavis.edu/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid=
b5e1be3dc4f844dd94ca4a51d781bc0c1d (noting the difficulty of getting some of the defendants to
even present any type of benefits in settlement).
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goingto trial if the State does not believe the claim has merit or if the cost of
going to litigation does not directly implicate the prisons themselves.121 In
this respect, it is essential that the participating defendants are ready and
willing to come up with solutions that are agreeable to the prisonerplaintiffs.
The use of the mediation process over litigation may also address some
important needs of prisoners.122 An important aspect of the mediation
process that may be beneficial in prisoner civil rights cases is the need for
the prisoner to be heard.123 As prisoners, the plaintiffs in these cases live in
a highly dehumanizing environment.124 Their need for control or validation
may perpetuate their desire to file these grievances in the first place.125
When the prisoners get the opportunity to be heard, as is allowed in
mediation settlements and to some extent settlement conferences held by
magistrate judges, this satisfies that need.126 When a third-party neutral
mediator is the facilitator of settlement, the mediator may have more time
and experience in allowing the prisoner a chance to be heard. Judge
Kellison noted that in his settlement conferences, the help of the law
students of the McGeorge clinic often made the mediations run more
smoothly, at least in respect to allowing the prisoner to be heard before
moving to a negotiation with the prison.127 Judge Thurston explained that
even without the presence of a mediator or law student to listen to the
prisoner’s story, the prisoner often felt validated in being heard by a federal
judge, whether or not it was in a settlement conference rather than a
courtroom.128 The mediation process lends itself to resolving the underlying
issues in a conflict rather than just the dispute in the claim filed with the
court.129
Lastly, the relationship between the parties is on going, as after the
settlement of this conflict whether through mediation or litigation, the

121. Webcasts, UC Davis School of Law, Section 1983 Prisoner Litigation Fundamentals
Seminar (Dec. 2, 2011), http://mediasite.ucdavis.edu/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid=
b5e1be3dc4f844dd94ca4a51d781bc0c1d.
122. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Telephone Interview with Honorable Craig Kellison, supra note 75.
128. Telephone Interview with Honorable Jennifer L. Thurston, supra note 114.
129. See Otis & Reiter, supra note 95, at 372. “One of the strengths of mediation, as opposed
to adjudication, is that it is possible to explore a problem more holistically in an effort to resolve the
entire conflict and not simply its particular instantiation (the symptom, as it were) at a given point in
time.” Id.
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prisoner will still be under the control of the prison and those who work
there. The continued interaction between the parties illustrates an important
reason that mediation is beneficial in these types of conflicts. The way the
settlement of these cases take place influences how the relationship goes
forward, affecting both the life of the prisoner and the success of the prison
and its employees in maintaining control and creating a safe environment––
both for themselves and for the prisoners. Mediation allows for a mutual
agreement while addressing a broader conflict.
B. Issues with Implementation and General Concerns
There are some major concerns with the implementation of these types
of programs as well as specific aspects of some of the programs. The point
at which the mediation or settlement conference occurs and the screening of
which cases go to mediation are two important factors in the success of
mediations as a potential aid to judicial economy, especially in the Eastern
District of California. For example, the earlier in the process a mediation or
settlement occurs, the faster these cases are removed from the docket and the
less time court has to put in working on each individual case. Waiting until
the case survives summary judgment does involve distinct advantages in
terms of buy-in from the State in order to settle. After summary judgment
the State may see the case as having some real merit and then might prefer to
settle or be more inclined to participate in settlement than before the cases
goes through dispositive motions. If the program can somehow get the State
to “buy-in” with the process in order to allow for mediation or settlement
conferences earlier in the process, the program is more likely to ease the
district courts’ case loads and lighten the burden on the judges handling
these cases.
Possible ways to incentivize an early mediation process starts from the
courts themselves requiring such efforts.130 This may be that the courts use a
specific and uniform screening process in order to flag certain types of cases
which will customarily be successful in mediation. In the Eastern District, it
130. But see Webcasts, UC Davis School of Law, Section 1983 Prisoner Litigation
Fundamentals
Seminar
(Dec.
2,
2011),
http://mediasite.ucdavis.edu/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid=
b5e1be3dc4f844dd94ca4a51d781bc0c1d (highlighting that there is a need for the courts to
encourage such a process, but that there is a fine line between coercion and encouragement––the
more coerced parties feel to enter into mediation, the less likely that the parties will reach a
successful settlement).
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might not be feasible or efficient at this point to make the screening
requirement include looking for trends in order to settle large groups of
cases at once, but it may instead be helpful to look for trends in order to help
identify which cases should be immediately––and early on––diverted to
mediation or settlement. In order for a program to be successful, it must
have a screening component by which complaints that are frivolous or not
appropriate for mediation for some other reason are identified.131
Additionally, with time and set screening criteria, the State may become
comfortable with the process of settlement and therefore, be more likely to
take an active role in settling these claims early.
Other than the State’s “buy-in” issues in the Eastern District, there are
also “buy-in” issues with the courts as a whole. In order for ADR programs
in prison litigation claims to effectuate change, the programs need to become
more uniform and involve more district court judges and federal judges than
it currently does. If all of the judges and staff attorneys assigned to these
cases are working under the same set of screening requirements and
processes for getting these cases to mediation, the efficiency of such
programs will greatly improve.
The need for ADR settlement programs in the Eastern District in dealing
with prisoner litigation cases stems from a large number of these cases filed
in the district with a lack of resources in order to resolve them within the
traditional court system.132 In order to allow these programs to become
effective in alleviating the stress on the district and ensuring, the district
needs funds to support the implementation and study of these programs.
Without widespread support for the program and implementation of district
standards for the program, the efforts of the Eastern District may prove to be
as frustrating as bailing out a flooding boat with a teaspoon.
Additionally, support for these types of programs involves public
perception of prisoners and how they understand the process. These
settlements may be perceived by the public as the State giving money to
criminals for their frivolous claims about prison life.133 On the one hand,
this can promote settlement because prisoners may not want to take a chance
at convincing a jury that they have been wronged because the jury will not
be very sympathetic to past crimes.134 This issue as to a certain stigma
attached to settling with convicted criminals may include using alternative
131. See Cole & Silbert, supra note 103, at 324.
132. THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS, supra note 2.
133. See Borchardt, supra note 21, at 479-84.
134. Webcasts, UC Davis School of Law, Section 1983 Prisoner Litigation Fundamentals
Seminar (Dec. 2, 2011), http://mediasite.ucdavis.edu/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid=
b5e1be3dc4f844dd94ca4a51d781bc0c1d.
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forms of remedies within the settlement rather than focusing on monetary
damages. These remedies may include: waiver of filing fees, apologies,
policy changes, injunctive relief, items from the canteen, access to
specialists, specialized diet, transfer of cell, and religious worship
concessions.135 By using alternative means for settlement, the mediation
process can become more successful at actually reaching settlement as well
as serve as an example for future prisoner grievances for relief.
V. BENEFITS OF MEDIATION TO JUDICIAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
While the ADR prisoner litigation program in the Eastern District of
California has great potential to improve judicial economy, its benefits to
social justice have not yet been fully discovered by the courts. Along with
aiding in physically taking cases off the docket, implementing such
programs has the power to influence the way disputes are handled inside the
prisons themselves, thereby reducing prisoner grievance filings in the federal
courts overall.
While prisoners’ needs are often overlooked, the state of prisons is not
only harmful to prisoners but also to the safety of the prison staff.
Furthermore, the costs of the prison systems and the issues with
overcrowding place a strain on the already weak fiscal position of the nation.
In addition, issues with rehabilitation and release may also be influenced by
the widespread use of mediation programs in prisons.136 Finally, if the court
can model a dispute resolution process that the institutions can use to settle
these types of disputes themselves as part of the grievance process, these
complaints do not have to go to court.137
Through ADR programs in the Ninth Circuit, there has been some
surprisingly positive feedback on the part of correctional officers at certain
institutions as it relates to the safety of the prisons.138 Some correctional
officers concluded that once judges entered the prison to hold a settlement
agreement, the prison became a safer place.139 This may be in part to the
135. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46; Telephone Interview with Sujean Park,
supra note 70; Webcasts, UC Davis School of Law, Section 1983 Prisoner Litigation Fundamentals
Seminar (Dec. 2, 2011), http://mediasite.ucdavis.edu/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid=
b5e1be3dc4f844dd94ca4a51d781bc0c1d.
136. Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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prisoners feeling like they had some actual form of redress, as an alternative
to the court system, symbolized by the judges actually entering the
premises.140 In addition, the legitimate opportunity to be heard may act as a
deterrent to other means of perceived justice on the part of prisoners.
The prospect of using federal court ADR programs in prisoner civil
rights cases as an example for in-house prisoner grievance systems could
serve to greatly lessen the need for prisoners to file these grievances in the
first place. Currently, there are some downfalls with the institutional prison
in-house administrative remedies.141 While PLRA requires that prisoners
exhaust all of these possible remedies before filing in court,142 the grievance
systems are somewhat lacking.143 Prisoners have found it necessary to keep
track of the paperwork they receive through the in-house administration
process in order to be able to prove that they have exhausted these remedies.
144

The employees of the prisons whose job it is to determine whether the
prisoners’ claims have merit and provide the proper avenues for redress
often lose or take no action with the grievances filed by the prisoners.145 If,
through training and by example in the mediation process of the federal
ADR programs, the institutions can utilize mediation skills in handling these
grievances, they will be able to handle the problems of the prison within the
prison.146 This way, the court will not have to interfere on sensitive issues
regarding the day-to-day happenings in the prison while providing prisoners
with a productive system to settle their disputes.147
Taking the possibilities a step further, if the mediation model and skills
can be implemented as part of the administrative exhaustion of remedies, it
may also be implemented as a life-training tool for the prisoners.148 These
skills may provide the prisoners with alternative means to resolve disputes
both in prison and when they are released.149

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
See Borchardt, supra note 21, at 490.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012).
Interview with Denise M. Asper, supra note 46.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The overburdened Eastern District of California has struggled to find a
solution to the magnitude of prisoner litigation overwhelming its dockets.
The large geographical area and large number of prisons within the district
has created a unique problem that is getting little aid by way of the
government. The ADR programs already in place in the Eastern District of
California have great potential as a tool for protection of prisoner civil
rights, judicial economy, and as a long-term strategy to move the grievance
process back into the prisons.
If the program in the Eastern District of California can establish a more
clear and uniform procedure for screening which complaints are ripe for
mediation and when such complaints will go to mediation or settlement
conferences, more cases will be able to settle out of further litigation within
the courts. If the program can be established as the main way these prisoner
grievance cases are resolved, the potential to use mediation methods to
resolve disputes within the prisons themselves may prove to be the best way
to remove these cases from the court.
The conditions of prisons and prisoners’ civil rights while incarcerated
are not always at the forefront of public discourse. However, the use of
mediation to settle cases of constitutional rights violations is mutually
agreeable to both prisoner and the State and it simultaneously addresses the
continuing relationship between the two. These programs have the potential
to not just settle the conflict in front of the parties presently, but to influence
future interactions between the parties. The ability to influence long-term
relationship dynamics may prove to solve issues with case overloads in the
Eastern District of California, but it may also address some major issues
within the prisons and institutions themselves.
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